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by Michael Degnan, Ph.D., and Russ Pannier, Ph.D. 
The authors are both on the staff of the Department of Philosophy. 
University of St. Thomas. St. Paul, MN. 
Abortion. The very word stirs people's emotions. Some feel that the 
woman's right to her body is absolute, while others feel the same about the 
right to life of the unborn. Heated discussions about abortion rarely attend 
to the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court's Roe V. Wade decision which 
in effect overturned all state laws restricting abortions. I In this article we 
submit the Court's arguments to some techniques of logical analysis. We 
hope to show that even relatively simple applications oflogical analysis can 
reveal serious weaknesses in the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Roe case. 
In Roe the Court struck down a Texas statute which prohibited all 
abortions except those performed for the purpose of saving the mother's 
life. The Court fashioned a three-part rule for regulation of abortions: 
(I) During the first trimester of pregnancy, government must leave the 
abortion decision to the medical judgement of the attending physician. 
(2) After the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, government may, if it 
chooses, pursue its interest in the mother's health by imposing regulations 
reasonably related to maternal health. 
(3) After the fetus becomes viable (approximately at the end of the second 
trimester), government may, if it chooses, pursue its interest in potential life 
by prohibiting abortion except where abortion is necessary to preserve the 
life or health of the mother. 
The Court resolved the issue under the 14th Amendment's Due Process 
Clause, which provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." The Court's basic theory 
was that this clause provides a special degree of protection for 
"fundamental" rights. This special degree of protection consists of a 
requirement that government demonstrates that any burden it imposes 
upon a fundamental tight be a necessary means of promotinga compelling 
governmental interest. 
This requirement on governmental laws concerning abortion is an 
instance of the Court applying a "strict" standard of review in contrast to a 
"minimum rationality" standard of review, the standard the Court uses 
most of the time. A standard of review is a Court created criterion used to 
determine when governmental interests can override personal rights. 3 The 
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"minimum rationality" standard requires that governmental regulations 
promote permissible objectives in a rational way. The minimum 
rationality standard differs from the strict scrutiny standard in two 
respects. First, instead of requiring the governmental objective to be 
"compelling" (an interest than which there is no other interest of greater 
importance), it merely requires that the objective be "permissible" (within 
the range of legitimate governmental concerns). Second, instead of 
requiring that the means used to promote the objective be "necessary" 
(indispensable for), it requires only that the means be "rationally related" 
to the objective (basically that it be conceivable that at least one rational 
person might think that the means is a useful step toward the objective). 
The contrast between the two standards can be easily seen by 
considering the consequences of their respective applications. When the 
Court applies a minimum rationality standard of review, the governmental 
regulation at issue almost always survives constitutional scrutiny. The 
Court applies this standard to what it perceives as social welfare or 
economic legislation. For example, in 1976 the Court upheld a 
Massachusetts law that required state patrol officers to retire at age 50.4 
Judging this to be economic legislation, the Court let the law stand even 
though it overrides the rights of the patrol officers.5 On the other hand, 
when the strict scrutiny standard of review is applied, the regulation is 
almost always invalidated. In 1925, for example, the Court found 
unconstitutional an Oregon law requiring children to be ~ent to public 
schools, for it deemed the parental decision about where to educate one's 
child as a personal right, fundamental to the notion of individualliberty.6 
The Court's practice has been to accord special scrutiny protection to 
personal rights it considers fundamental. 7 
In Roe the Court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review to the 
abortion question by means of the following syllogistic argument: 
I. Any personal right that is fundamental has special scrutiny protection. 
2. The right to have an abortion is a personal right which is fundamental. 
3. Hence, the right to have an abortion has special scrutiny protection. 
Of course, the argument is deductively valid. But noticing this is only the 
beginning. Most legal arguments can be put into a deductively valid form. 
Given such a formulation, the interesting question is whether the premises 
have been or can be plausibly supported by other arguments. 
It is astonishing that the Court paid little attention to the matter of 
arguing for premise 2. The nearest thing to an argument in the long 
majority opinion is a few lines of a single paragraph in which the Court 
says that prohibiting abortions imposes upon pregnant women economic, 
physical and psychological detriment. The court writes, 
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The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying 
this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable 
even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may 
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be 
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imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also 
the distress for all concerned , associated with the unwanted child. 
The argument seems to come to something like this: 
I. All interests whose frustration would cause economic, physical and 
psychological burdens are fundamental rights . 
2. Frustration of the abortion interest causes economic, physical and 
psychological burdens. 
3. Hence the abortion interest is a fundamental right. 
Now, one of the most problematic aspects of this argument is its first 
premise. If it is true, then a great many interests are fundamental rights and 
so eligible for special constitutional protection. One can plausibly argue 
that, say, denial offree public education or a minimum wage would impose 
economic, physical and psychological burdens upon those unable to pay 
for such benefits. Yet the Court has been unwilling to hold that the 
Constitution requires public education or public welfare .9 Furthermore, it 
seems that prohibiting the murder of, say, elderly people who can no 
longer care for themselves imposes substantial brudens upon families who 
have the primary responsibility for them. But does it follow that such 
families have special constitutional permission to take the lives of such 
dependents? 
Thus, the first premise can be refuted with the logical principle, modus 
tollens: If a proposition P is true then another proposition Q is also true. 
But Q is false . Hence, P is false as well. As applied to the first premise we 
have: If all interests whose frustration would cause economic, physical and 
psychological burdens are fundamental rights then welfare and education 
interests are fundamental. But welfare and education interests are not 
fundamental. Hence, it is not the case that all interests whose frustration 
would cause economic, physical and psychological burdens are 
fundamental rights. 
One might read the Court's citation of earlier privacy decisions as 
constituting implicit arguments by analogy. The suggestion would be that 
Roe follows by analogy from the facts and holdings of cases such as 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the decision holding that the use of contraceptive 
devices is entitled to special scrutiny protection under the Due Process 
Clause.1o An argument based upon Griswold might take the following 
form: 
I. Contraceptives are a means of birth control. 
2. Abortion is a means of birth control. 
3. Contraceptives are entitled to special constitutional protection. 
4. Hence, abortion is entitled to special constitutional protection. 
An argument by analogy is only as strong as the degree of relevant 
similarity between the objects of comparison. The use of contraceptive 
devices and abortion are distinguishable in at least one important respect. 
The latter involves termination of a life form; the former does not. Hence, 
February, 1992 55 
the analogy is weak. I I There would have to be support for the claim that 
abortion is a privacy interest reaching beyond the kinds of considerations 
marshalled by Griswold. Similar points can be made concerning all of the 
privacy decisions cited in Roe. 
Upon reading the Due Process Clause it may seem to some that the 
Court should have upheld the Texas statute since medical science agrees 
that from conception the unborn is a member of the human species, i.e., a 
human being. Three leading psychologists, Paul Mussen, John Congar, 
and Jerome Kagen wrote in a standard tex~, Child Development and 
Personality, "The life of each individual begins when a sperm cell from the 
father penetrates the wall of an ovum, or egg, from the mother." Alan 
Guttmacher, before he served as president of Planned Parenthood, wrote 
in a book entitled Having a Baby: A Guidefor Expectant Parents, that the 
exact moment of creating a baby was fertilization. Since Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary of the English Language as well as the 
Oxford English Dictionary define person as a living human being, it seems 
that the unborn must be considered a person. From this it should follow 
that abortions must be restricted so as not to deprive the unborn person of 
life without due process. 
The Court, however, did not see things so simply. It refused to resolve 
the question of the time when life begins because it found a divergence of 
opinion concerning the time of life's beginning. But the word "life" 
misleads here, for surely the Court did not mean to deny that the embryo 
or the fetus is alive. It is more charitable to read it as asserting that the 
question of when human life begins need not be resolved. But since talk of 
human life is tantamount to talk of personhood, the Court was apparently 
refusing to determine when personhood begins. 
However, the Court implicitly denied that the unborn ever becomes a 
person prior to birth. For, if there were a point prior to birth at which the 
unborn becomes a person then states would be constitutionally required to 
protect it from that point onward. This is a conditional proposition of the 
form "If P then Q." We know that the court denies Q, for it expressly said 
that the states are not required to protect the fetus at any point. The state's 
interest in potential human life takes effect only after viability and , even 
then, the states are not required to protect that interest. Thus, application 
of a simple principle of logic shows that the Court apparently contradicted 
itself. On the one hand, it said that it was not deciding the issue of when 
personhood begins. On the other hand, it held in effect that whenever 
personhood does begin, it certainly does not begin prior to birth. 
Now, it is true that the Court apparently believed that at the point of 
viability the fetus becomes what might be called a "quasi-person," where 
that term connotes the legal status a life form has when government may, if 
it chooses, protect it by law. There are at least two logical points which can 
be made about this notion of quasi-personhood. 
First, the Court offers no argument for its claim that viability is a 
relevant criterion for quasi-personhood. But the claim is surely not self-
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evident. Why should ability to survive outside the womb be deemed 
relevant on the question of when quasi-personhood begins? 
Second, the Court revealed its unstated (and controversial) assumption 
that personhood is a comparative, rather than a categorical, concept. That 
is, the Court apparently assumed that there are degrees of personhood. 
One life form can have the characteristic of personhood in a greater degree 
than another life form . The Court implicitly rejected the idea that either a 
life form is a person or it is not. In addition, the Court apparently assumed 
that the degree of legal protection to which a life form is entitled is a direct 
function of the degree of personhood that form possesses. 
Now, being unstated assumptions, it is not surprising that the Court 
offers no support for them. But they require support. Consequences which 
many believe unacceptable apparently follow from them. For example, if 
personhood is a matter of degrees, and if legal rights are a function of the 
degree of personhood one has, then it is difficult to see why, say, mentally 
retarded persons have a right to life . To simply assume without statement 
or argument premises which seem to have such startling implications 
seems, to say the least, logically careless. 
Still one might insist that the Court allowed for the protection of 
prenatal life in the third trimester and so afforded some protection to the 
unborn. This protection, however, is illusory. The Court held that at the 
third trimester abortions can be regulated by the state in the interest of 
prenatal life except when an abortion is necessary to preserve the life or 
health of the mother. However, given the Court's definition of health as 
expressed in Doe v. Bolton, a companion decision to Roe, the Court in 
effect allowed for virtually no restrictions on abortions even in the third 
trimester. 
The Court wrote that "the medical judgment may be exercised in the 
light of all factors- physical, emotional, psychological, familial , and the 
woman's age- relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors 
may relate to health,"12 According to the Court if a woman can convince 
one doctor that her emotional and psychological well being will be 
disturbed by giving birth to a child, then the state's interest in protecting 
prenatal life can be overridden. It would be a rare case where a doctor 
willing to perform an abortion would not be convinced that his patient's 
emotional well being required the abortion she asked for. So the 
protection the state can give to third trimester prenatal life is severely 
limited. 
In fact there seems to be an inconsistency here. The Court said that 
states can restrict abortion in the 3rd trimester to protect its compelling 
state interest in prenatal life at this stage. Yet it effectively denied the state 
the means to exercise this protection in any way discernably different from 
what was allowed in the 2nd trimester. The Court withdrew with one hand 
the protection it appeared to extend with the other. J3 
With this examination we have shown that the Roe case has s~rious 
logical and constitutional difficulties . Roe can be considered bad 
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constitutional law for some of the reasons that our logical analysis has 
uncovered . This result might simply be of interest to lawyers and logicians 
were it not for the fact that this Court decision has made possible the legal 
destruction of over twenty million unborn human lives since 1973. 
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